7 июня Бен Бернанке выступил с речью «Перспективы экономики США» в Атланте. ВЫступление дает хорошее представление того, как ФРС оценивает состояние экономики и какие могут быть дальнейшие шаги.
Дальше Бен Бернанке отвечает на критические замечания в адрес Феда.
Against this backdrop of extremely robust growth in demand, the supply of many commodities has lagged behind. For example, world oil production has increased less than 1 percent per year since 2004, compared with nearly 2 percent per year in the prior decade. In part, the slower increase in the supply of oil reflected disappointing rates of production in countries that are not part of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, OPEC has not shown much willingness to ramp up production, either. Most recently, OPEC production fell 1.3 million barrels per day from January to April of this year, reflecting the disruption to Libyan supplies and the lack of any significant offset from other OPEC producers. Indeed, OPEC's production of oil today remains about 3 million barrels per day below the peak level of mid-2008. With the demand for oil rising rapidly and the supply of crude stagnant, increases in oil prices are hardly a puzzle.
Production shortfalls have plagued many other commodities as well. Agricultural output has been hard hit by a spate of bad weather around the globe. For example, last summer's drought in Russia severely reduced that country's wheat crop. In the United States, high temperatures significantly impaired the U.S. corn crop last fall, and dry conditions are currently hurting the wheat crop in Kansas. Over the past year, droughts have also afflicted Argentina, China, and France. Fortunately, the lag between planting and harvesting for many crops is relatively short; thus, if more-typical weather patterns resume, supplies of agricultural commodities should rebound, thereby reducing the pressure on prices.
Not all commodity prices have increased, illustrating the point that supply and demand conditions can vary across markets. For example, prices for both lumber and natural gas are currently near their levels of the early 2000s. The demand for lumber has been curtailed by weakness in the U.S. construction sector, while the supply of natural gas in the United States has been increased by significant innovations in extraction techniques.5 Among agricultural commodities, rice prices have remained relatively subdued, reflecting favorable growing conditions.
In all, these cases reinforce the view that the fundamentals of global supply and demand have been playing a central role in recent swings in commodity prices. That said, there is usually significant uncertainty about current and prospective supply and demand. Accordingly, commodity prices, like the prices of financial assets, can be volatile as market participants react to incoming news. Recently, commodity prices seem to have been particularly responsive to news bearing on the prospects for global economic growth as well as geopolitical developments.
As the rapid growth of emerging market economies seems likely to continue, should we therefore expect continued rapid increases in the prices of globally-traded commodities? While it is certainly possible that we will see further increases, there are good reasons to believe that commodity prices will not continue to rise at the rapid rates we have seen recently. In the short run, unexpected shortfalls in the supplies of key commodities result in sharp price increases, as usage patterns and available supplies are difficult to change quickly. Over longer periods, however, high levels of commodity prices curtail demand as households and firms adjust their spending and production patterns. Indeed, as I noted earlier, we have already seen significant reductions in commodity use in the advanced economies. Likewise, over time, high prices should elicit meaningful increases in supply, both as temporary factors, such as adverse weather, abate and as investments in productive capacity come to fruition. Finally, because expectations of higher prices lead financial market participants to bid up the spot prices of commodities, predictable future developments bearing on the demands for and supplies of commodities tend already to be reflected in current prices. For these reasons, although unexpected developments could certainly lead to continued volatility in global commodity prices, it is reasonable to expect the effects of commodity prices on overall inflation to be relatively moderate in the medium term.
While supply and demand fundamentals surely account for most of the recent movements in commodity prices, some observers have attributed a significant portion of the run-up in prices to Federal Reserve policies, over and above the effects of those policies on U.S. economic growth. For example, some have argued that accommodative U.S. monetary policy has driven down the foreign exchange value of the dollar, thereby boosting the dollar price of commodities. Indeed, since February 2009, the trade-weighted dollar has fallen by about 15 percent. However, since February 2009, oil prices have risen 160 percent and nonfuel commodity prices are up by about 80 percent, implying that the dollar's decline can explain, at most, only a small part of the rise in oil and other commodity prices; indeed, commodity prices have risen dramatically when measured in terms of any of the world's major currencies, not just the dollar. But even this calculation overstates the role of monetary policy, as many factors other than monetary policy affect the value of the dollar. For example, the decline in the dollar since February 2009 that I just noted followed a comparable increase in the dollar, which largely reflected flight-to-safety flows triggered by the financial crisis in the latter half of 2008; the dollar's decline since then in substantial part reflects the reversal of those flows as the crisis eased. Slow growth in the United States and a persistent trade deficit are additional, more fundamental sources of recent declines in the dollar's value; in particular, as the United States is a major oil importer, any geopolitical or other shock that increases the global price of oil will worsen our trade balance and economic outlook, which tends to depress the dollar. In this case, the direction of causality runs from commodity prices to the dollar rather than the other way around. The best way for the Federal Reserve to support the fundamental value of the dollar in the medium term is to pursue our dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability, and we will certainly do that.
Another argument that has been made is that low interest rates have pushed up commodity prices by reducing the cost of holding inventories, thus boosting commodity demand, or by encouraging speculators to push commodity futures prices above their fundamental levels. In either case, if such forces were driving commodity prices materially and persistently higher, we should see corresponding increases in commodity inventories, as higher prices curtailed consumption and boosted production relative to their fundamental levels. In fact, inventories of most commodities have not shown sizable increases over the past year as prices rose; indeed, increases in prices have often been associated with lower rather than higher levels of inventories, likely reflecting strong demand or weak supply that tends to put pressure on available stocks.
Finally, some have suggested that very low interest rates in the United States and other advanced economies have created risks of economic overheating in emerging market economies and have thus indirectly put upward pressures on commodity prices. In fact, most of the recent rapid economic growth in emerging market economies appears to reflect a bounceback from the previous recession and continuing increases in productive capacity, as their technologies and capital stocks catch up with those in advanced economies, rather than being primarily the result of monetary conditions in those countries. More fundamentally, however, whatever the source of the recent growth in the emerging markets, the authorities in those economies clearly have a range of fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, and other tools that can be used to address any overheating that may occur. As in all countries, the primary objective of monetary policy in the United States should be to promote economic growth and price stability at home, which in turn supports a stable global economic and financial environment.
И наконец про монетарную политику.
Monetary Policy
Let me conclude with a few words about the current stance of monetary policy. As I have discussed today, the economic recovery in the United States appears to be proceeding at a moderate pace and--notwithstanding unevenness in the rate of progress and some recent signs of reduced momentum--the labor market has been gradually improving. At the same time, the jobs situation remains far from normal, with unemployment remaining elevated. Inflation has risen lately but should moderate, assuming that commodity prices stabilize and that, as I expect, longer-term inflation expectations remain stable.
Against this backdrop, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has maintained a highly accommodative monetary policy, keeping its target for the federal funds rate close to zero and further easing monetary conditions through large-scale asset purchases. The FOMC has indicated that it will complete its purchases of $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of this month while maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. The Committee also continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period.
ФОМС указал, что он завершит покупку казначейских бумаг на 600 млрд. долларов к концу месяца, в то время как сохранит существующую политику реинвестирования денег, полученных от погашения. Ставка федеральных фондов остнется на низком уровне еще долгое время.
The U.S. economy is recovering from both the worst financial crisis and the most severe housing bust since the Great Depression, and it faces additional headwinds ranging from the effects of the Japanese disaster to global pressures in commodity markets. In this context, monetary policy cannot be a panacea. Still, the Federal Reserve's actions in recent years have doubtless helped stabilize the financial system, ease credit and financial conditions, guard against deflation, and promote economic recovery. All of this has been accomplished, I should note, at no net cost to the federal budget or to the U.S. taxpayer.
Действия Федрезерва в последние годы несомненно помогли стабилизировать финансовую систему, облегчить кредитование и финансовые условия, защитить экономику от инфляции и стимулировать экономическое восстановление. Все это уже достигнуто безо всяких затрат со стороны федерального бюджете или налогоплательщика.
Сам себя не похвалишь - никто тебя не похвалит!
Although it is moving in the right direction, the economy is still producing at levels well below its potential; consequently, accommodative monetary policies are still needed. Until we see a sustained period of stronger job creation, we cannot consider the recovery to be truly established. At the same time, the longer-run health of the economy requires that the Federal Reserve be vigilant in preserving its hard-won credibility for maintaining price stability. As I have explained, most FOMC participants currently see the recent increase in inflation as transitory and expect inflation to remain subdued in the medium term. Should that forecast prove wrong, however, and particularly if signs were to emerge that inflation was becoming more broadly based or that longer-term inflation expectations were becoming less well anchored, the Committee would respond as necessary. Under all circumstances, our policy actions will be guided by the objectives of supporting the recovery in output and employment while helping ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the Federal Reserve's mandate.
Хотя движение идет в правильном направлении, экономика все еще работает на уровнях заметно ниже ее потенциала.
Необходимость в мягкой монетарной политике сохраняется.
Дэвид Розенберг делает следующие выводы из выступления Бернанке
- The Fed seems to have cut its second-half forecast of near-4% real growth to something closer to 2.5-3.0% ... growth is now seen to pick up just "somewhat" in the second half of the year from what looks like a sub-2% trend in the first half. Not exactly a ringing endorsement for pro-growth cyclically sensitive investments.
- The broad focus seems squarely on the labour market — what seems to be Bernanke's greatest worry is lack of traction. The words "jobs", "labour", "employment" and "unemployment" collectively showed up no fewer than 23 times. The comments on how aggregate hours worked are still more below the cycle high than was the case at the depths of the 1982 should be resonating on even the most ardent growth bulls and inflation-phobes.
- On fiscal policy, his comment suggests that he is concerned that the zealots will tighten the budgetary screws too hard over the near term — hence his emphasis on the need for "long-term" solutions.
- The Fed expects commodity prices to stabilize and as such for inflation to decline going forward. Interesting to see the analysis that ALL of the build-up of inflation so far has been due to gas prices, which seem to have peaked.
- Another QE round cannot be dismissed after reading this sombre assessment of the macro backdrop; at the least, the funds rate stays on hold and that should provide an anchor for yields out the steep Treasury curve.
