Дефляция постепенно отступает: индекс потребительских цен впервые за последние 5 месяцев демонстрирует положительную динамику. Он увеличился на 0,2% м/м и на 0,1% г/г.
По прогнозам экспертов статистического отдела Министерства внутренних дел Японии, в марте промпроизводство вырастет на 2,6% и на 0,7% в апреле. Последний прогноз ОЭСР указывает на то, что темпы роста японской экономики станут самыми заметными среди развитых стран. В I квартале ВВП страны увеличится на 3,4%.
Республиканец Jeff Sessions нашел разрыв в доходах и расходах по социальным статьям в 17 трлн. долларов.
That someone is Republican Jeff Sessions who after actually running the numbers has uncovered that the true long-term funding gap is a mind-boggling $17 trillion, just a tad more than the original sub $1 trillion forecast. This latest revelation means that total underfunded US welfare liabilities: Medicare, Medicaid and social security now amount to $99 trillion! Add to this total US debt which in 2 months will be $16 trillion, and one can see why Japan, which is about to breach 1 quadrillion in total debt (yen, but who's counting), may want to start looking in the rearview mirror for up and comer competitors. And while Obama may have been taking creative license with a number that is greater than total US GDP, he was most certainly correct when saying that Obamacare would not add a penny to US debt. Because the second the US government comes to market to fund a true total debt/GDP ratio of 750%, it is game over, and the Fed will have its hands full selling Treasury puts every waking nanosecond to have any time left for the daily 3pm stock market ramp.
Региональный долг Испании значительно увеличился в последнее время
Spanish regional debt currently stands at 13% of GDP and has surged from EUR60bn in 2006 to over EUR140bn currently. As Credit Suisse points out, the top four regions account for the majority of GDP, two-thirds of regional debt, and, with the exception of Madrid, substantially missed their deficit targets. What is more worrisome is the heavily front-loaded nature of the maturing debt with substantial refinancing needs in the next 2 years and this regional debt is split between bonds and loans - with many of the latter from Spanish banks - yet another illustration of the interconnected contagion that is building more rapidly. The growing crisis in refinancing (liquidity and costs) for regional debt developed the idea of Ponzibonos 'Hispabonos' - debt issued by regions but guaranteed by the central government. The conditionality of these guarantees with regard to deficit targets wil be critical but once they are issued, the risk is that the regions are unable to get their finances under control, the Spanish debtload increases, and there is no longer the flexibility for a regional debt restructuring, should one be necessary.
Банки так загружены акциями, что у них нет другого выбора, как продолжать ралли.
Yup - the banks are so loaded up with toxic stocks that they have NO CHOICE but to keep the ramp accelerating higher and higher until "stupid" retail comes back in and distribution happens, leaving the retail investor holding the hollow bag again. Alas, there were no inflows this week either. Which means that just like Italian banks, the meltup could well accelerate even more from here.
European Sovereign Yields have been under pressure for most of the last month...seems the market doesn't buy the firewall idea...
Почему не работает идея EFSF/ESM?
So at some point in the near future there will be about €40 billion of money sitting in the ESM and a bunch of promises from countries failing to live up to existing debt obligations, and that is the big firewall? The correlation between who is providing the guarantees and who will need them cannot be ignored. This new €500 billion number doesn’t exist, it’s not just meaningless, it’s non-existent if Italy or Spain needs money.
People can take away whatever they want, but unlike LTRO which had real injections of liquidity, this is just like the July plans from last year and the November “grand” plans. It sounds great, especially when too many people are willing to blindly follow what the politicians want them to, but it doesn’t work in practice.
Все разговоры о размерах фондов EFSF/ESM – обман с целью отвлечь внимание. Это лишь обещание заплатить, а не сами деньги.
When considering the financial condition of each and every country in the European Union there are certain facts that are left out and left out on purpose. In our opinion, the structural deformity of the European Union is, in itself, one of the main reasons that any attempt at a fiscal or economic fix never seems to work. Whether some proposed firewall is $760 billion or $1.3 Trillion or $13 Trillion makes no difference as in zero, nada, nothing and null. It is an IOU, a promise to pay and it is not counted in any European sovereign debt numbers nor is it counted in the figures for the European Union’s debt. It will not stop Spain or Portugal or Italy from asking for or needing money. This whole discussion is a head fake, a deception and a ruse carefully plotted out for investors in one more attempt to mislead the entire world. If you wish to be a statistic in the Greater Fool Theory be my guest but I refuse to be apart of this unadulterated scam.
Германский Бундесбанк отказался принимать в залог бонды, гарантированные государствами, получившими помощь от Евросоюза и МВФ
Germany’s Bundesbank is the first of the 17 euro-area central banks to refuse to accept as collateral bank bonds guaranteed by member states receiving aid from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported.
And what happens then? Since it is inevitable that Spain and Italy will be next on the bailout wagon, what happens when over $2 trillion in bonds suddenly become ineligible for cash collateral from the only solvent central bank in the world (aside for that modest, little TARGET2 issue of course). Will it force the ECB to be ever more lenient with collateral, and how long until the plebs finally realize that the ECB has been doing nothing but outright printing in the past 5 months? What happens to inflationary expectations then?
Джим Грант критикует политику Федрезерва. Очень классная статья!
I can’t help but feel slightly hypocritical in dressing you down. What passes for sound doctrine in 21st-century central banking—so-called financial repression, interest-rate manipulation, stock-price levitation and money printing under the frosted-glass term “quantitative easing”—presents us at Grant’s with a nearly endless supply of good copy.
One can think of the original Federal Reserve note as a kind of derivative. It derived its value chiefly from gold, into which it was lawfully exchangeable. Now that the Federal Reserve note is exchangeable into nothing except small change, it is a derivative without an underlier. Or, at a stretch, one might say it is a derivative that secures its value from the wisdom of Congress and the foresight and judgment of the monetary scholars at the Federal Reserve. Either way, we would seem to be in dangerous, uncharted waters.
As you prepare to mark the Fed’s centenary, may I urge you to reflect on just how far you have wandered from the intentions of the founders? The institution they envisioned would operate passively, through the discount window. It would not create credit but rather liquefy the existing stock of credit by turning good-quality commercial bills into cash— temporarily. This it would do according to the demands of the seasons and the cycle. The Fed would respond to the community, not try to anticipate or lead it. It would not override the price mechanism— as today’s Fed seems to do at every available opportunity—but yield to it.
Ladies and gentlemen, such stability as might be imposed on a dynamic capitalist economy is the kind that eventually comes around to bite the stabilizer.
“Price stability” is a case in point. It is your mandate, or half of your mandate, I realize, but it does grievous harm, as defined. For reasons you never exactlyspell out, you pledge to resist “deflation.” You won’t put up with it, you keep on saying—something about Japan’s lost decade or the Great Depression. But you never say what deflation really is. Let me attempt a definition. Deflation is a derangement of debt, a symptom of which is falling prices. In a credit crisis, when inventories become unfinanceable, merchandise is thrown on the market and prices fall. That’s deflation.
What deflation is not is a drop in prices caused by a technology-enhanced decline in the costs of production. That’s called progress.
Much the same sentiments, and much the same circumstances, apply today, but with a difference. Digital technology and a globalized labor force have brought down production costs. But, the central bankers declare, prices must not fall. On the contrary, they must rise by 2% a year. To engineer this up-creep, the Bernankes, the Kings, the Draghis—and yes, sadly, even the Dudleys—of the world monetize assets and push down interest rates. They do this to conquer deflation.
But note, please, that the suppression of interest rates and the conjuring of liquidity set in motion waves of speculative lending and borrowing. This artificially induced activity serves to lift the prices of a favored class of asset—houses, for instance, or Mitt Romney’s portfolio of leveraged companies. And when the central bank-financed bubble bursts, credit contracts, leveraged businesses teeter, inventories are liquidated and prices weaken. In short, a process is set in motion resembling a real deflation, which then calls forth a new bout of monetary intervention. By trying to forestall an imagined deflation, the Federal Reserve comes perilously close to instigating the real thing.
Сценарий этого года повторяет сценарии двух прошлых лет
"In each of the past two years the stock market began a slide in the spring, a phenomenon often referred to by the old adage 'sell in May and go away,' which lasted well into the summer months," wrote LPL Financial's Jeff Kleintop in his latest weekly market commentary.
The pattern is almost eerily similar.
"In both 2010 and 2011 an early run-up in the stock market, similar to this year, pushed stocks up about 10% for the year by mid-April. On April 23, 2010 and April 29, 2011, the S&P 500 made peaks that were followed by 16 – 19% losses that were not recouped for more than five months."
We still have a few weeks before the end of April. But until then, Kleintop is carefully watching 10 indicators that turned ahead of the sell-off.
European equity prices fell for the third day in a row and pulled back near six week lows, breaking below the 50DMA for the first time since it crossed above on 1/16. Today's drop was the largest in three weeks as Italian banks were halted, plunging their most in over three months and back at levels not seen since mid January. Most Italian banks are down 9-11% in March but BMPS is down over 24% as Italian sovereign yields start to come unhinged again (ironically a day after Monti announced the crisis was over). 10Y BTPs broke back below last Friday's lows (the moment the ECB stepped in last time to save the day) up over 5.2% yield - catching up to CDS levels (and ITA spreads are +23bps on the week). Spain is also weak (+15bps on the week) and heading for 3 month highs in its yields. Since the CDS roll (March 20th), the sell-off has accelerated with equity and credit markets tracking lower together (as opposed to the last few months where credit underperforms and then snaps back higher). We discussed the LTRO Stigma trade earlier and that has continued sliding notably wider today as LTRO-encumbered banks hugely underperform. We suspect hedges (sovereign credit, financial credit, and equity) placed early in the year for the 3/20 Greece event (among other things) have run off and now managers are reducing risk in real terms (selling) as opposed to replacing hedges which is why the uber-supported markets of Italy and Spain are losing the battle now. Lastly, Europe's VIX is its richest relative to US VIX since the rally began, jumping dramatically today.
Нынешний год – маленькое подобие 1987 года. Тогда тоже все хорошо начиналось, а закончилось биржевым крахом
The last time the S&P 500 rallied in such a serene manner as the current trend was March 1987 - a few months before monetary imbalances came undone and crashed in October 1987. Further, JPMorgan's Michael Cembalest notes that prior to WWII, the previous rally as calm and uninterrupted as this was in November 1928 - a year before the crash.
Unlike yesterday's 5 year bond auction, which priced at the lowest Bid To Cover since August, there were no major surprises during the just concluded issuance of $29 billion in 7 Year bonds. The closing high yield was 1.59%, just as the When Issued predicted, which is the highest rate since October. The internals were more or less inline - Indirect takedown of 42.79% was the highest since August's 51.72%, Directs decline modestly from February's soaring 19.27%, to just 13.40%, which still was quite a bit higher than the TTM average 12.23%. Dealers were left with 43.81% of the auction, about 3% below their average. And while the market was sensing a weak auction ahead of the pricing, the subsequent favorable response in the Treasury complex has sent the entire curve tighter again, and money flowing out of stocks, which had hit an intraday high just before the auction completion. In other news, total US debt is now over $15.6 trillion.
Видео, которое Zero Hedge рекомендует обязательно посмотреть
David McWilliams (of Punk Economics) is back (previous discussions here and here) and this time he takes on the the flood of liquidity and the false recovery that has been created. Starting with a discussion of gas prices and the central banks' recklessness behind it, he swiftly shifts to the 'shambles in Greece' where more debt is supposed to solve the problem of too much debt yet again. From extreme highs in Greek rates to extreme lows in rates among the major developed economies he juggles with the conundrum of injecting liquidity to reflate a bubble in order to avoid the consequences of the bursting of a bubble - brilliant (as those Guinness chaps would say) - as this merely pushes the next crash out a few more years but making it bigger and more devastating. Global Central banks have pumped $8.7tn into the banking system to 'save the world'. Saving the banks has cost more money than it cost to fight WWII, the first Gulf War, put a man on the moon, clean up after last year's Japanese Tsunami, and the entire African aid budget for the last 20 years all put together. Context is key - is it any wonder asset prices have risen since there has been so much cash looking for a new home - why hold something that is printed everyday (cash) when you can hold something that is actually running out like oil or gold. The punchline is what goes in must come out - and that means inflation - as the 'trip' of excess liquidity comes home to roost. Must watch.
Европейские банки используют средства ЕЦБ на скупку облигаций, а не на кредитование.
В феврале объем кредитования нефинансовым компаниям снизился на 3 млрд евро против роста на 1 млрд евро в январе. В то же время денежная масса зоны евро увеличилась на 2,8% в феврале по сравнению с январским ростом в 2,5%.
В то же время банки Италии и Испании нарастили покупки гособлигаций. Так, итальянские финансовые организации увеличили объем своих вложений на рекордные 23 млрд евро. Это довело их общий объем участия в этом рынке до 301,6 млрд евро. Испанцы в свою очередь отошли от январского рекорда в 23 млрд евро. В феврале они потратили на госбумаги 15,7 млрд евро. Их вложения в облигации еврозоны оцениваются в 245,8 млрд евро.
Today's $35 billion 5 Year auction was not very pretty: coming at a high yield of 1.04%, it was a tail to the When Issued trading 1.03% at 1pm, and the highest rate since October's 1.055%, and the first 1%+ print in 2012. Also notable was the drop in the Bid To Cover to 2.85, which in turn was the lowest since the 2.71 in August of last year. Aside from that the internals were in line: Directs took down 11.3%, in line with the 11.4% average, Indiricts 41.9%, just below the 42.8% TTM average, and the remainder was Dealers, whose 46.8% allocation was just slightly lower than the 45.8% they have taken down previously. All in all another auction that squeezed by courtesy of the PD syndicate, which as has been noted before, is already loaded to the gills with the short-term bonds that Uncle Ben is selling. More importantly, this is the auction that in conjunction with tomorrow's last of three, will send total US debt higher by another $39 billion and brings it to a fresh record high $15.6 trillion. There is now about $700 billion in debt issuance capacity before the debt ceiling is breached again. At this run rate, this is just under 6 months before the debt ceiling scandal ramp up again, or just in time to be used by the GOP as the biggest trump card in the Obama reelection debates, just as we suggested here first back in February.
ZH считает, что новый лимит госдолга наступит через 6 месяцев
European equities dropped their most in almost three weeks over the last two days closing right at their 50DMA (the closest to a cross since 12/20). Credit markets (dominated by financial weakness) continue to slide as the LTRO euphoria wears off. The LTRO Stigma, the spread between LTRO-encumbered and non-LTRO-encumbered banks, has exploded to over 107bps (from under 50bps at its best in mid Feb when we first highlighted it) and is now up over 75% since the CDS roll as only non-LTRO banks have seen any improvement in the last week.
ESM не сможет произвести столь положительный эффект, как LTRO.
The Euro area is a financially closed region, with more than 85% of sovereign bonds held by residents of the area. If we add to this the fact that most claims against governments are held by financial institutions domiciled in the area, the risk of ‘financial fires’ spreading is high. The prevailing policy view that bigger ‘firewalls’ would make investors more comfortable about purchasing sovereign bonds of EMU countries. This is predicated on the idea that the existence of a funding backstop would prevent credit shocks in one of the EMU members from spreading to other issuers. That said, we doubt the current infrastructure can produce the same effects on markets as the ECB’s long-term liquidity injections (LTROs). Our view is based on the following considerations.
Size: Even if we combine the full uncommitted capacity of the EFSF and the ESM (EUR700bn), the total would not be sufficient to backstop the bigger markets of Spain and Italy. The former’s borrowing requirement (amortization plus deficit) over the next two years is EUR305bn, while the latter’s amounts to EUR525bn.
Seniority: The ESM holds ‘preferred creditor status’ over existing bondholders (art.13 of the Treaty establishing the ESM). In practice, this means that if the facility is used to provide an EMU member country under conditionality, it would subordinate existing bondholders (twice, if the IMF also participates in a bailout). Given that investors are aware of this, they would require compensation to bear such risk. This could exacerbate, rather than mitigate, a crisis.
Governance: The existing vehicles cannot intervene pre-emptively in markets at signs of tension. Rather, they would be activated only after a full crisis has erupted. The procedure envisages that the ECB would ring an alarm bell should tensions threaten the stability of the Euro area. The sovereigns experiencing tensions would need to formally ask for help, and sign a memorandum of understanding, before any financial support can provided. Admittedly, a ‘fast track’ option is also available, based on ‘light conditionality’ and allowing the EFSF to intervene in secondary markets. Still, the fixed size of resources could raise questions on the effectiveness of the operations.
Провал на китайском рынке акций давит на кросскурсы AUD
We have been monitoring Chinese equities for clues as to where investor sentiment lies, as China provides much of the spare capacity for commodities demand. If China's economy slows more strongly than expected, then commodities will feel the brunt of that and that has a big impact on commodity linked currencies like the Australian Dollar.
В этой ситуации CAD выглядит привлекательнее, чем AUD
As we had looked at previously, the growth divergence story between the US and China has helped the CAD to make sizable gains this month against the AUD, and we can see that fundamental trend continue if expectations around China continue to show disappointment.
We'll continue to monitor Chinese equiteis to see if we have further follow through to the downside, as well as what impact that will have on commodities like copper, as well as the general US Dollar Index.
О странном происшествии, которое произошло с акциями BATS. Цены на них на несколько десятков миллисекунд упали до 0.
we relied on our friends from Nanex, who have time and again proven to have a far better grasp of what it is that really happens in the market than virtually anyone else. And if Nanex' interpretation of events is correct (spoiler alert - it was not a "software glitch") it takes SkyNet wars from the silver screen and to a trading terminal near you. What happened is that a malicious, 100% intentional Nasdaq algorithm purposefully brought BATS stock to a price of 0.00 within 900 millisecond of the company's break for trading! This is open SkyNet warfare.
It had to be someone who's machines are directly connected to Nasdaq because they used Intermarket Sweep Order orders.
The current rally is running long; equities are due for a 3-5% pull-back' is how Deutsche Bank begins to give some context to the scale of the performance of stocks over the last four months. Whether it be liquidity-fueled optimism, optically-pleasing macro data, crisis-fatigue, or just good old-fashioned back-up-the-truck-we're-all-in buying since the last 10% correction in November, the S&P 500 has rallied 22% - essentially unimpeded for 80 days without a drawdown. In between 5% selloffs, the median rise in the S&P 500 is 10% and the duration is 56 days so this current rally is indeed getting long in the tooth (with a 2.5% retracement the best the bears have managed in 2012). To get a better sense of how equities may perform after such a big rally, Deutsche identifies 8 similar cases to the current one when a 10%+ drawdown was followed by a 15%+ recovery: Jul-50, May-70, Dec-74, Aug-98, Sep-01, Oct-02, Feb-03 and Mar-09. At the same point in the rally (i.e. after 3mo), the market continued to grind higher the next 3 months by 4% on average. So a move of this size and velocity (and smoothness) has only occurred 7 times in the history of the S&P 500 and a quick glance at some of those dates marks some notable periods in US economics (and global geopolitics).
Deutsche Bank проводит историческое исследование предыдущих ралли на фондовых рынках
It is rather surprising that in a world in which anything and everything is only about money, it is next to impossible to find a consolidated balance sheet of the world's insolvent economies (i.e., the developed countries: US, Japan and the Euro Area). So for all those seeking a visual presentation of all the liabilities that have to be inflated away by the central banks (because that's what this is all about), rejoice: the broke world is presented below in its glory. The irony is that the problem would be quite fixable if it weren't for one minor issue: the bulk of the world's assets also happen to be its liabilities! At the end of the day, this may prove to be the fatal flaw in the chairman's attempt to dilute the global liabilities, he will be doing the same with the assets.
We will follow up with an analysis of what this actually means shortly (those who have been reading in the past year can come to their own conclusions), but more importantly we well next show how the global "household" sector is invested across these three distinct economies by assorted asset class. Prepare to be rather surprised as various conventionally accepted notions are thoroughly debunked...\
Большая часть мировых активов является чей-то задолженностью и это может оказаться очень неприятным для мировой системы, поскольку обесценивая обязательства, они то же самое сделают и с активами.
Here we find not the usual issues with the periphery nations but obligations and guarantees for the entire European construct. The analysis of Germany, past their stated GDP and their stated debt to GDP ratio is really a study of the EU/ECB themselves to determine the size and the liabilities that are born by their largest economic member so that we can fully assess the financial condition of Germany and not blindly accept what is officially put out in the Press.
Официальные5 и реальные показатели долга к ВВП Германии сильно отличаются
German Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $3.2 trillion
Official German Sovereign Debt: $2.618 trillion
Percentage of Liabilities at the European Union: 27%
Percentage of Liabilities at the ECB 18.94%
Germany’s Percentage of the ECB Debt ($4 trillion) $757.6 billion
German annual cost for the EU budget $46.36 billion
German Guarantees for the Stabilization Funds $280.6 billion
German Guarantees for the Macro Financial Assistance Fund $211.14 billion
German Target-2 Liabilities $656 billion
German Guarantee for the EIB Debt $157.29 billion
Sovereign Guarantee for KFW $588 billion
Total German Sovereign Debt & Guarantees $5.315 trillion
First it was Bob Janjuah throwing in the towel in the face of central planning, now we get the same sense from Bill Gross who in his latest letter once again laments the forced transfer of risk from the private to the public sector: "The game as we all have known it appears to be over... moving for the moment from private to public balance sheets, but even there facing investor and political limits. Actually global financial markets are only selectively delevering. What delevering there is, is most visible with household balance sheets in the U.S. and Euroland peripheral sovereigns like Greece." Gross' long-term view is well-known - inflation is coming: "The total amount of debt however is daunting and continued credit expansion will produce accelerating global inflation and slower growth in PIMCO’s most likely outcome.
Бюджетная ситуация в Японии весьма-весьма уязвима.
From Marketwatch: “The government budgeted ¥44 trillion in net additional borrowing in the next fiscal year, nearly half of its expenditures. It needs to double its tax revenue to balance the budget. But, as the economy is deflating with declining private consumption, a major tax increase would cause the economy to go down more, shrinking the tax base and requiring even bigger tax increases to balance the budget.”
From Marketwatch: “Even though the yield on 10-year Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) is only 1%, the interest expense is expected to top ¥22.3 trillion in the fiscal year that begins next month. This is one-quarter of the general account budget. If the bond yield rises to 2%, the interest expense would surpass the total expected tax revenue of ¥42.3 trillion.”
The total amount of the central bank's planned government debt purchase through the end of this year jumped to nearly ¥38 trillion ($465 billion), an amount roughly equal to all the new bond issuance planned by the Japanese government for the period. This is the first time since the program began in October 2010 that central-bank-asset purchases came anywhere near the amount of government new issuance.
From the program's inception in October 2010 through the February meeting, the BOJ bought ¥4 trillion in JGBs through that facility. Gov. Shirakawa said the central bank will purchase ¥15 trillion more through the end of this year.”
FX Times ставит на падение йены
One of the few ways out for the Japanese economy, its government and the central bank is for the JPY to continue its depreciation. It seems that the BOJ will be playing from the Fed's and BOE's playbook at this point - buy up bonds from a government that is spending at an unsustainable level, and through QE try and weaken the currency to help exporters and restore competitiveness for the economy.
That means that the BOJ gets more aggressive in expanding its balance sheet as a percentage of GDP, and with that increase, further downward pressure on the JPY.
Therefore, the theme of a weaker Yen may be here to stay, and we should look for opportunities to play pullback on JPY crosses, and to build some longer term positions short the JPY.
It's a big week for Spain. Prime Minister Rajoy has to deliver the 2012 Budget on Friday and is also facing his first national strike as Prime Minister on Thursday. Added to that Rajoy failed to gain a majority in elections in Andalucía, Spain's largest autonomous region. This was always going to be a hard sell as Andalucía is traditionally a Socialist strong hold and has an unemployment rate above 30%.
Что в действительности крупные инвесторы думают о рынке
Barclays' Paul Robinson провел опрос 400 крупных инвесторов
Вот некоторые результаты опроса
The US economy is likely to keep growing according to the majority of investors.
The most popular asset class is equities right now, with 37% saying it will outperform the rest.
Within the credit space, the plurality (39.5%) think high yield credit (equities in drag) will do the best.
75% expect that the current operation twist will be extended in some manner.
91% of respondents think the yield on the 10-year bond will remain below 2.75%, in part thanks to the expectation of the Fed staying accommodative.
In both credit and equities, US-based assets are the most popular.
The US dollar is also expected to be be a strong currency performer.
Экономика США продолжит рост, акции – наиболее популярный актив, 75% ожидают, что операция «Твист» будет продолжена в том или ином виде, 91% ожидают, что 10y bonds останутся по доходности в пределах 2,75%, активы США будут наилучшими активами, доллар США будет оставаться сильным.
Консенсус сходится к тому, что они ожидают продолжения текущего тренда
Взгляд Goldman Sachs на речь Бернанке, которая вызвала такой взрыв энтузиазма у рынка
Below is Jan Hatzius' take on the "surprising" Chairman speech which essentially said QE can and will come at any time there is a downtick it the market, masked by the unemployment rate rising to its fair value, as estimated by Gallup, somewhere around 9%.
From Goldman Sachs:
BOTTOM LINE: Fed Chairman Bernanke argued that the outperformance of labor market indicators recently may reflect a “catch-up” from unusual weakness in jobs during the recession. By implication, continued declines in unemployment will require faster GDP growth in the future. He also continued to argue that most of the increase in long-term unemployment is cyclical rather than structural in nature. Chairman Bernanke’s read on the state of the labor market was consistent with an accommodative stance for monetary policy—though he did not directly call for additional easing.
Но никаких четких намеков на QE не было
On monetary policy, the Chairman said that faster growth—perhaps needed to see further declines in unemployment—“can be supported by continued accommodative policies”. He also argued that because the increase in long-term unemployment was primarily cyclical, “then accommodative policies to support the economic recovery will help address this problem as well”. These statements were not necessarily calls for additional easing, but they clearly supported the Fed’s current accommodative stance.
This is a key week to see if this push lower in the Aussie represents a dip or if more weakness still exists in the pair. The lack of domestic data out this week may keep the market focused on USD positioning and external AUD influences.
Ключевым драйвером для AUD на этой неделе станет официальный PMI Китая
Обсуждается идея британского министра финансов выпустить 100-летние бонды
(UK Daily Telegraph): Britain is to offer 100-year gilts, meaning current Government borrowing will not be repaid until the next century, ...
The Chancellor hopes that the 100-year gilts will help to “lock in” the benefits of Britain’s international “safe haven” status. The interest rates paid by the Government to borrow money have recently fallen to a record low and it is hoped the new gilts will mean “our great-grandchildren” can benefit from the low rates.
Currently, the average duration of the Government’s £1 trillion debt is around 14 years – with maturities ranging from months to a 50-year bond issued in 2005. Longer-dated debt is widely thought to offer a country more stability.
A Treasury source said tonight: “This is about locking in for the future the tangible benefits of the safe haven status we have today. The prize is lower debt interest repayments for decades to come.
“It is a chance for our great-grandchildren to pay less than they otherwise would have done because of the government’s fiscal credibility.”
Национальной ассоциации пенсионных фондов не нравится эта идея
(FT): The National Association of Pension Funds on Wednesday criticised the chancellor’s plans for an “Osborne bond” – a 100-year debt issue or even a perpetual gilt that never matures – saying it would prefer shorter maturity debt that was protected against inflation.
One senior UK fund manager said: “This could be of interest for pension funds as it would be a good match for their liabilities.” But another said: “We would not be buyers of this debt because the yields are too low. It would be great for the government and the British taxpayer, but I don’t think we would want to lock in yields so low for such a long time. Yields are artificially low because of the Bank of England’s quantitative easing initiative.”
Инфляция съест эти инвестиции
From the Government’s point of view it was a masterstroke which transformed the public finances, but it was a disaster for investors. The new stock immediately plunged in value, yet the real damage was to come later from the value destructive effects of
inflation. £1,000 invested in the War Loan back then would in today’s money be worth less than £20.
In terms of US activity data, the focus will be on the Chicago PMI, Durable Goods and Personal Income. Though we do expect a technical rebound in the durable good orders after the weakness in the previous report, we think the Chicago PMI could slip by more (to 60 from 64) than consensus expects. Overall, the message from US activity data may therefore remain mixed outside the still-strong labour market data.
In terms of Asian activity data, the end of the week will be important. The official China PMI for March will be interesting after the weakness in the Flash PMI. Korean trade is the first non-survey based activity indicator published globally that is published for the previous month. Both are due next Sunday.
по поводу валютного рынка
In terms of FX markets, we will remain quite focused on the Yen, partly because of our recommendation and partly because of the fiscal year-end in Japan and related possible last-minute volatility. The IP number for February could be important as the main data release for Japan in the upcoming week. Given the focus on rate differentials for $/JPY, but also more broadly for the Dollar, three speeches by Chairman Bernanke on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday could be relevant. The upcoming week is very heavy on Fed speeches with at least one scheduled every day.
270 млрд. долларов в студенческих займах имеют задержку в погашениях более 30 дней.
Yet one bubble which the Federal Government managed to blow in the meantime to staggering proportions in virtually no time, for no other reason than to give the impression of consumer releveraging, was the student debt bubble, which at last check just surpassed $1 trillion, and is growing at $40-50 billion each month. However, just like subprime, the first cracks have now appeared. In a report set to convince borrowers that Student Loan ABS are still safe - of course they are - they are backed by all taxpayers after all in the form of the Family Federal Education Program - Fitch discloses something rather troubling, namely that of the $1 trillion + in student debt outstanding, "as many as 27% of all student loan borrowers are more than 30 days past due." In other words at least $270 billion in student loans are no longer current (extrapolating the delinquency rate into the total loans outstanding). That this is happening with interest rates at record lows is quite stunning and a loud wake up call that it is not rates that determine affordability and sustainability: it is general economic conditions, deplorable as they may be, which have made the popping of the student loan bubble inevitable.
В гонке по девальвации валют (баланс/ВВП) Фед неожиданно оказался на последнем месте. На первом месте теперь ЕЦБ, который опережает даже BOJ
As the following chart from Willem Buiter shows, in its fake attempt to show monetary restraint, the Fed has gone straight into last place in the "race to debase." Needless to say, in a world with $25+trillion in "excess" debt (debt which would need to be eliminated simply to reduce global debt/GDP to a "sustainable" 180% per BCG), last is a very bad place to be...
as Sean Corrigan notes this week, money is distinct by virtue of the fact that 'it flows' and this transmission mechanism is clearly broken. US non-financial corporates hoarding of a $630bn mountain of money in 2.5 years (or 85% of retained earnings) have retarded the most incendiary effects of the Fed's extraordinary actions. The key issues will be whether these same corporates will begin to spend this cash, or whether they will simply rediscover an appetite for alternative, non-money assets (and the Fed should certainly take the opportunity to trim its swollen security portfolio by helping satisfy this reawakened urge, should it arise) and then, if they do, what those to whom they redirect the funds will do with them in their place. If the upshot is that there is a sizable remobilization of this money, things could quickly get very hot on the inflationary front if the transition is not managed well.
Считается, что если цены на дома снижаются, то рано или поздно они найдут спрос.
The general idea of lower home prices is that once prices fall to some magic threshold, buyers will jump in and liquidate the inventory. That notion makes two enormous assumptions: 1) Interest rates will stay near-zero when inflation is factored in. 2) Household income will stop declining. In other words, there are three inputs to housing affordability, and price is only one of them. Interest rates and disposable income are equally important.
Структурные проблемы предстоит еще решать, а экономике восстанавливаться после приема «чрезвычайных медицинских средств».
In his latest note published in Project Syndicate, El-Erian says there are structural problems that need to be addressed. He cautions against complacency and says the economy needs to recover from the "extreme medicine it received" i.e. fiscal stimulus and other policies enacted by the Fed:
But legendary value investor Doug Kass isn't having any of it. He goes so far as to exclaim, "I can't help but think that Goldman Sachs might have rung the bell that the market has topped in the near term!" in an editorial published by The Street today.
Три графика, которые показывают, что еврокризис никогда не закончится
If ever there were banks that were truly Too-Big-Too-Fail, Europe has them - is it any wonder the Greek Bailout was so focused on rescuing the bank balance sheets. Swiss banks dominate the worst end of the spectrum along with Dutch banks (huge covered bond markets) but the French, Spanish, and Belgian banks are all around two times their nations GDP! Of course this assumes the asset values are 'correctly priced' and not some non-MtM dream and while they are deleveraging (which itself causes aggregate credit supply issues for the real economy and overhangs for the financial economy), LTRO has done nothing but slow the efforts in a false-sense-of-security way. We could add a bonus chart here on European bank reliance of ECB funding - that shows Italy and Spain nearing Portugal's level of aggregate reliance - not exactly a resounding success.
Отношение процентных платежей к производственным доходам экономики быстро растет.
Perhaps the cleanest measure of 'stress' or service-ability for the currency-using sovereigns shows that the amount European sovereigns pay in interest relative to their productive gains as an economy is rising rapidly and forecast to rise even faster. This will obviously get worse as the recession deepens from both rising costs (as post-LTRO rate normalize) and lower GDP (as austerity and balance sheet recession impacts come home to roost).
Левередж находится на 20-летних максимумах.
The 'leverage' of the Euro-Area has never been higher. Across every nation, we are at over 20 year highs in terms of this measure of leverage. To impact this via the fiscal compact by raising taxes and deleveraging at the aggregate level can only exaggerate the recessionary pressure Europeans will feel.
While yields have indeed dropped, the reflexive response that ergo - Europe is fixed - is simply nonsense as nothing has changed and in fact the concentration and contagion stress is worse than it ever was. This time may be different as this time, the ECB is really in a box to fix the next risk flare without outright money-printing and Zee Germans vill not like zat!
Новые греческие бонды драматически упали за последние два дня.
Well that didn't take long. New Greek bonds (GGB2) have dropped dramatically in the last 2 days. The 2023 bond has fallen from over EUR29.5 on Wednesday to under EUR25.5 this morning, prices have dropped an incredible 14% and down a painful 17.5% from its opening break highs of just 2 weeks ago. Yields have broken back above 20% for the first time for this new 10Y as it appears reality is sinking in that Greek Bailout III will come sooner rather than later. Eurosis is back.
So the reality is, the only banks that might buy long dated Spanish bonds are Spanish banks, and they are already pretty full of Spanish debt and even they much prefer to buy the short end. In theory, that special little subset of Spanish banks, the Caja’s, might do as they are told, but since they are already on life support, that is hardly a deep pocket investor.
Испанские банки и другие финансовые организации, и они уже под завязку загрузились испанским долгом
Banks always tended to buy 5 year and in. 10 year bond never fit banks as well as shorter dated bonds, so they were never the core buyer of this part of the curve. This desire to be in shorter maturities has been accentuated by the LTRO. LTRO encourages banks to buy 3 year and in paper for 2 reasons – i) no funding mismatch at maturity of LTRO, and ii) since LTRO is collateralized, far less risk of having to post variation margin on short duration bonds (at least until the whole curve inverts). So banks across the board have many incentives to participate in the short end which was their natural tendency to begin with. So banks as a whole do not like the long end, and foreign banks will dislike it even more. It is very hard for a non-Spanish bank to justify long term positions in Spain. There is $100 billion of debt in the Spanish system where banks issued bonds to themselves, got it guaranteed by Spain, and are using those bonds to get central bank money. As a non-Spanish bank, you have to look at that cozy relationship and be nervous. If, and when, the Spanish financials deteriorate, it is hard to expect fair treatment as a foreign bank when it is so clear that Spanish banks and the government have become very interconnected.
Иностранцам покупать долгосрочный долг Испании очень рискованно.
Officials can talk about the low debt to GDP in Spain, but professional investors have to look at all the contingent and hidden debt. Spain has implicitly and explicitly guaranteed the municipal debt. The Spanish government is in up to its eyeballs in helping the Caja’s. They have participated in the LTRO ponzi bond scheme even more than Italy has on a relative basis. These contingent liabilities will make insurance companies more reluctant, but that would still be part of the “fundamental” analysis.
There are relatively few natural buyers of Spanish long dated bonds here. Fast money is likely caught long, and it will take a potentially reluctant ECB and some already overly exposed Spanish institutions to step up and stop the slide. It may happen, but many of the policies that “bailed out” Greece created very bad precedents for bondholders, and some of those are coming home to roost, as is the understanding that LTRO ensures that banks can access liquidity, but does nothing to fix any problem at the sovereign level.
За 3 последних года публичный долг США был увеличен на 20 трлн. долларов и нет никакого быстрого роста ВВП.
In only three more years you're talking $20 trillion in public debt for the USA and a GDP going nowhere fast. Add to this that demographics are not encouraging and taxes of all sorts will have to rise. Cuts will be symbolic because the political pain will be unbearable. Without productive new investment, then debt service soon outstrips income growth and the economy enters a death spiral of declining productive investment, ever expanding debt and ever higher debt service costs.
Как он будет обслуживаться в быстроменяющейся экономической обстановке?
Опубликован Бюллетень Центрального Банка Швейцарии
We would like to note, there is a slightly optimistic tone in the report. As risks have remained marginally unchanged, the bulletin notes improvements in the financial markets and mixed developments on the global growth front. While the SNB still views the overvalued CHF as a "challenge to the economy", they mentioned "growing indications that Switzerland's economy is stabilizing." The SNB goes on to state that the minimum exchange rate has reduced volatility and allowed businesses to plan with greater certainty. "For 2012, the forecast shows an inflation rate of -0.6%. For 2013, the SNB is expecting inflation of 0.3% and for 2014, of 0.6%". While the 2012 inflation path was adjusted downwards, from Dec 2011 forecast, it still represents a trough. Heading progressively higher in Q2 2012 saying "SNB expects the CPI to move over the next three years". Interestingly, the SNB forecast assumptions are based on Brent at $110 and EURUSD at 1.29. It's looking highly unlikely that a shift in the minimal exchange rate is coming anytime soon, but this report will clearly reignite debates on the likely timing of the exit. We are currently seeing CHF appreciation against both the USD and EUR.
Соединение слабой экономики и сильной валюты – это очень странная вещь.
The combination of a weak economy and strong currency are always suspect. But it has lasted for so long that even foreigners take it for granted. I think this is some sort of mass hysteria. Most people only remember a strong yen. On the other hand, most people haven't seen rising property or stock markets either.
Сильная йена – это психологический феномен.
Japanese culture is group-oriented. Individuals usually embrace group activities. This psyche was the reason that Japan's property bubble became so big in the 1980s. In terms of value above the normal level, Japan's bubble was five to six times the size of the bubble in the United States. After the property bubble, the group psyche shifted its power to a strong yen, pushing Japan's economy onto the path of a rising yen, deflation and rising government debt.
Japan's paralyzed political system is the reason the government has accommodated the deflation path by running up national debt. The Japanese people, on the other hand, buy the debt because deflation makes property or stocks bad investments and a strong yen discourages them from buying foreign assets and deflation.
Despite the fact Japan has had a bad economy for so long, the yen has remained strong. It reinforces the Japanese psyche on the issue. The strong yen has become a cult.
"I think it's generally acknowledged that equities are in the better position than bonds," said Darby. "But we've had an enormous rally over the last six months, and positioning now in equities has become quite aggressive. So I suspect you need to put this into a time frame that we'd have to look for some form of a correction of 5% to 9% in the equity markets given the risk appetite that's already been placed into share."
Darby sees this stock market sell-off coming soon, but not until after the first quarter.
Darby также считает, что центральные банки не позволят доходностям дальше расти.
He also noted that central banks are unlikely to let yields to continue to rise, which would cause bond prices to fall. "It's not in the policy-makers' interest to see yields continue to rise, so expect more quantitative easing," he said. "You've got quite a bit of time to move out of fixed-income into equities."
In his latest report, Ting Lu, China economist for Bank of America-Merrill Lynch points out three main reasons for the decline:
"First, compared with official PMI, the HSBC index focuses more on SME, which could be hit harder by tight liquidity, though we believe China’s liquidity condition is being improved. Second, since China’s export manufacturers tend to be of small scale, the HSBC PMI sample could also have more exposure to exports. In Jan-Feb, export growth decelerated to 6.9% YoY from 14.3% in 4Q11. Third, small manufacturers, which lack of economy of scale, are being consolidated into big ones."
While a reading below 50 indicates contractionary level and the figure is likely to bring out the China bears, Lu says that China is not looking at a hard landing. Lu expects liquidity conditions to improve and projects year-over-year GDP growth of 8.3 - 8.5 percent this in the first quarter.
2 графика, которые свидетельствуют о том, что LTRO – это реальный провал
What is most worrisome however is the absolute and utter lack of impact to the ‘real economy’ of Europe as PMIs have continued to slip and sentiment stumbles – nowhere is this more evident than in charts of Corporate Credit Demand and Corporate Credit Availability, which as Morgan Stanley notes today, suggest the deleveraging balance sheet recessionary impacts felt in Japan and the US are now writ large in European minds as minimizing debt dominates maximizing profits (or living standards). Demand for credit is sliding for both large and small firms and bank lending standards continue to tighten aggressively for both large and small firms. As austerity continues and credit contracts, it seems apparent that the much-hoped for shallow recession in Europe will be deeper and longer than most currently believe.
Спрос со стороны компаний на кредиты снижается, требования к заемщикам растут.
Demand from small firms for credit - just as we saw in the US - is lagging notably now. Large firms also are showing falling demand but at a shallower rate but with jobless rates so high already and the smaller firms (as in the US) as the engine of job creation, it seems problems are playing out in a similar path to the other deleveraging regions of the world...
Backwardation means that anyone who has gold or silver could simultaneously sell the metal and buy futures contracts to recover their position, and make a profit. The market is tight. The metal is out there, but obviously those who have it in an unencumbered form are not able (retail) or willing (others?) to take this backwardation bait.
Известный своими неудачными прогнозами Столпер из GS дает новые рекомендации.
"Advice" which Goldman Sachs provides to "muppets") in that he prefers to be short USDJPY from 82.8 (suggesting JPY strength on the back of seasonal patterns and the recent deterioration in the trade balance as being transitory temporary). Given his recent track record, being long the USD against the JPY would seem appropriate and his stop (and therefore the target) at around 84.5.
It will come as no surprise to many that the warm-weather-induced ebullience and renaissance in the US housing market is perhaps floundering as all that demand was dragged forward. Today's notable miss in the FHFA Home Price Index (at unch vs an expectation of +0.3%) is ugly but the huge downward revision from +0.7% to merely +0.1% in the previous month is now the ninth consecutive notable downward revision.Add to that the fact that FreddieMac just reported mortgage rate cracking over 4% (from 3.92% to 4.08%) and the ugly data on MBA applications and...well at least we're decoupling.
Доходность облигаций европейской периферии стала расти, и диффенциал между банками, принявшими участие в LTRO (слабыми банками) и не принявшими ликвидность от ЕЦБ растет, показывая недоверие рынка к зависящим от помощи ЕЦБ кредитным учреждениям. Это то, что получило название LTRO-стигма.
The LTRO Stigma (the spread between LTRO-encumbered banks and non-LTRO-encumbered banks) has jumped again and is near its worst levels since the initial LTRO at over a 90bps differential. Corporate credit and stocks are also notably weaker as credit decompresses to catch up with stocks weakness as CDS roll technicals unwind.
Tchir of TF Market Advisors анализирует кривую доходности облигаций Испании
Spanish Yield Curve
With ZIRP and LTRO it is hard to get a good read on the Spanish yield curve and what anything means.
Spanish 10 year yields have risen 9 days in a row, 5 year yields have moved higher 8 out of 9 days, and the 2 year has been much more mixed, until recently.
The 2 year yield is out 19 bps in those 9 days, but 18 bps of that move has occurred the last 2 days. The 2 year bond fits the sweet spot of LTRO, is likely to be held by banks in non mark to market accounts, so it has been stable, but it has even started to leak a little. The move is small, almost trivial, yet with all the things working to support 2 year bonds, it is curious that it is able to widen at all, let alone 18 bps in 2 days.
The 10 year yield is 48 bps higher, but the 5 year yield is 54 bps higher. The curve is still steep, but we are starting to see yields moving faster in the 5 year than in the 10 year. In the past 5 days, the 5 year yields have underperformed the 10 year by 7 bps. At the risk of making a mountain out of a mole-hill, this is worth watching. The move started with the entire curve steepening. So the move was bearish, but more isolated to the long end. The move is starting to impact the “belly” of the curve more. In a normal world, this small “flattening” of 5’s/10’s would be easy to ignore, but in a world where the curves are influenced (manipulated) by government policies that do everything possible to keep the front end anchored, this move may mean far more than it normally would.
Реакция AUD и CAD показали, как чувствительны рынки к новостям, касающимся замедления крупнейшей азиатской экономики.
There was a huge reaction from commodity currencies to HSBC's Chinese flash PMI data, with both the Kiwi and Aussie taking a hammering. Price action before the sell-off was characterised by more position rebalancing leading to a small rally, but the Chinese PMI data highlights how sensitive the market is to growth-negative news.
В Японии данные по торговому балансу оказались лучше ожиданий и это позитивно подействовало на JPY.
In Japan, merchandise trade balance data for February was released, with the headline figure printing well above consensus estimates at JPY32.9bn (exp. -JPY120.0bn). The surplus was a result of a 2.7%y/y slide in exports versus a previous -9.3%y/y, at the same time as imports increased 9.2%y/y after a 9.8%y/y increase for January.
The PMI figures tend to lead GDP changes and are released significantly in advance (hence why they are valuable). If the relationship holds, the GDP figures will reveal two consecutive quarters of falling output. Here’s where we stand:
Вот это важно!
Цифры PMI имеют тенденцию вести за собой изменение ВВП, публикуются со значительным опережением и поэтому имеют такое важное значение. Если привычная корреляция сохранится, то цифры PMI еврозоны прогнозируют два последовательных квартала снижения ВВП.
В этом вопросе немцы и так остаются примером для окружающих: еще в середине прошлого года аналитики ждали дефицита по итогам всего 2011 г. на уровне 2% от ВВП, однако по итогам 12 месяцев стало известно, что дефицит составил всего 1%. Уже в 2014 г. планируется сократить дефицит до символического минуса в 0,35%, а к 2016 г. и вовсе выйти на сбалансированный бюджет.
По данным Национального статистического ведомства Великобритании, общий объем государственных заимствований правительства в настоящее время оценивается в 110 млрд фунтов. До конца текущего финансового года остается всего один месяц. По данным независимых аналитиков, за весь фингод уровень госзаймов составит порядка 127 млрд фунтов, однако, учитывая последние данные статистического ведомства, итоговые займы окажутся на 7 млрд фунтов меньше прогнозных значений.
В 2011 г. Россия разместила рублевые еврооблигации на 90 млрд руб. Семилетние евробонды на 40 млрд руб. с доходностью 7,85% годовых размещены в феврале 2011 г., доразмещение этого выпуска на 50 млрд руб. проведено в мае.
Recently O'Neill said oil prices are his biggest concern not Greece. He reiterated the argument that China is creating an economy the size of Greece every 11.5 weeks, and asked: "Who cares about Greece?"
Каждые 11.5 недель Китай создает такую экономику, как Греция.
А вот с этого все началось:
This morning Goldman portfolio strategists Peter Oppenheimer and Matthieu Walterspiler made a bullish case for U.S. equities saying stocks are much cheaper than bonds. Jim O'Neill told CNBC he has been bullish on U.S. equities for a while:
"One is we have really low levels of bond yields, because many including policy makers do not believe things can ever return to normal. And the other one is we have people that don't believe that world growth can do better than it did at point x in the past. Being mister BRIC in reality despite western problems the world economy's growth rate is trending higher than it has been for 30 years of my existence. Put all of that together it is really bullish on equities."
Голдманисты считают, что акции стоят дешево по сравнению с бондами.
В долгосрочной перспективе, может, это правда... Но не в краткосрочной.
And though you might think that things are slowing down around the world, Goldman argues just the opposite, that the 2010-2019 period has more growth potential than any decade between 1980 to 2050.
Голдман считает, что период 2010-2019 годов имеет потенциал роста больший, чем любая декада с 1980 по 2050.
Sure, developed markets aren't growing as fast as they used to be. And even the BRICs are slowing down. BUT, because the BRICs are so big now, and because the N-11 countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam) are growing so fast, the net effect is that this decade could be a monster.
Вот график фантазий будущего аналитиков Голдмана
Откуда они знают, что будет в 2020-2050 годах? Линейная аппроксимация?
“Historically, the Discretionary/Staples spread has rallied with the broad market; in other words, it is not a leading indicator on rallies. However, it has also historically faltered before major indexes, making it a useful timing indicator and an early warning of trend failure. we see no weakness in this spread at this time.”
Отношение динамики двух секторов Discretionary/Staples американского фондового рынка может служить предостерегающим сигналом близкого разворота.
Как немецкие банки уходят из- под бдительного ока Феда.
Why are we not surprised at the fact, as reported by the WSJ, that Deutsche Bank AG changed the legal structure of its huge U.S. subsidiary to shield it from new regulations that would have required the German bank to pump new capital into the U.S. arm. The bank on Feb. 1 reorganized its U.S. subsidiary, known as Taunus Corp., so that it is no longer classified as a 'bank-holding company' (BHC). The technical change has important consequences.
Анализируется, когда Израилю наиболее удобно по времени нанести удар по Ирану
Based on press reports, officials see high odds of an attack sometime between 2Q12 and the end of the year, with most pointing to 2Q or 3Q.
If Israel elects to conduct a conventional military strike, the optimal conditions would be moonless and cloudless nights. “Operation Orchard,” Israel’s attack on Syria’s reactor at Al-Kibar on Sep 6, 2007, took place 5 days before the new moon. This suggests windows starting about 5 days before a new moon and ending five days after - see the table below. Low humidity is also ideal, but not required.
Дэвид Розенберг свидетельствует, что кэш находится вблизи минимальных уровней.
However, as Rosie points out equity fund cash ratios are at a de minimus 3.6%, the same level as in the fall of 2007 and near its lowest level ever. The time when cash was heavy and 'ample' was at the market lows in 2009 when the ratio was very close to 6%. Bond fund managers, it should be noted this includes the exuberant HY funds, are now sitting on less than 2% cash so if retail inflows continue to subside as they did this week, buying power could weaken over the near-term.
Albert Edwards из SocGen ожидает, что ралли в акциях скоро выдохнется и мы еще увидим новые минимумы доходности US Treasuries в этом году.
Albert Edwards explains: 'With bond yields breaking out to the upside and the equity bull run continuing, investors are back to their same old hopeful habits. Many are thinking that if we have seen the all-time lows on bond yields investors will be forced into equities. We already can observe leading indicators rolling downwards in exactly the same way as they did in 2011." And here is why Edwards will once again be unpopular with the permabull, momentum chasing crowd: "Expect new lows on bond yields by Q3 and this equity rally to turn to dust – just as it did in 2011."
Ситуация в европейских суверенных долгах начинает разворачиваться в худшую сторону.
Whether it was the truthiness of Willem Buiter's comments this morning, the sad reality of Spanish housing, or more likely the ugly fact that LTRO3 is not coming (as money-good assets evaporate), today was broadly the worst day of the year for European sovereigns. Spanish 10Y spreads jumped their most since the first day of the year, Italian yields broke back above 5% (and spreads broke back over 300bps), and Belgium, France and Austria all leaked notably wider. Since Friday's close, Italian and Spanish bonds have suffered their largest 2-day losses in over 3 months. Notably the CDS markets rolled their contracts into Monday and perhaps this derisking is real money exiting as they unwound their hedges - or more simply profit-taking on front-run LTRO carry trades but notably the LTRO Stigma has exploded in the last few days back to near its highs. European equity markets are now underperforming credit - having ridden the high-beta wave far above credit markets in the last few months (a picture we have seen in the US in Q2 2011 and HY is signaling risk-aversion rising in the US currently in the same way). Just how will the world react to another risk flare in Europe now that supposedly everything is solved?
Рынок недвижимости Ирландии/Испании не подпадает под категорию «слабый». Он хуже.
After a disappointing home sales print in the US (as the shadow overhang remains heavy), some perspective on just how bad it is in Europe is worthwhile. With Spanish yields starting to blow out again, it likely comes as no surprise that, as Goldman notes, the Spanish housing market (and for that matter the periphery in general) is bad and getting worse. However, Ireland remains the worst of the worst and Goldman sees yet another growing divide between the haves and have-nots of Europe as the residential property price performance can essentially be split into four groups: Strong, Recovering, Weak, and Ireland/Spain; with the latter perceived as considerably worse than the 'reported' data would suggest. Is it any wonder that Spain trades wide of Italy again now and as Citi's Buiter noted earlier, Spain is now the fulcrum market (Spanish 10Y spreads +30bps from Friday's tights).
Здравый смысл – это не то, что свойственно большинству.
As usual, Oaktree's Howard Marks cuts to the chase in his latest memo. Much as we just discussed the seeming complacency and drop in risk perception that currently exists, Marks scoffs at the 'It's Different This Time'-argument noting "there’s sure to be another cycle, another bubble and another crisis. There’ll be another time when people overpay for exciting investment ideas because their future appears limitless, and then a time of disillusionment and price collapse. There’ll be another period when leverage is embraced to excess, and then, consequently, a period when it gets people killed. And there’ll certainly be another time when people can only imagine the possibility of gain, and then one when – after huge sums have been lost – they can think only of further declines." Touching on the extremes of dysphoria and complacency that summarize the herd of global investors, he nails the reality of the crowd: "common sense isn’t common. The crowd is invariably wrong at the extremes. In the investing world, everything that’s intuitively obvious is questionable and everything that’s important is counter-intuitive."
Будет новый цикл, новый пузырь и новый кризис. Толпа неизменно неправа на экстремумах рынка.
В четверг в 6.30 по Москве выйдет индекс деловой активности в производственном секторе Китая, рассчитываемый банком HSBC – ключ к дальнейшему движению цен на commodities и риску в целом.
Главный китайский фондовый индекс Shanghai Composite и цены на медь уже отражают опасения инвесторов относительно роста китайской экономики.
Chinese Stocks and Copper Reflect This Pressure
China's main index – the Shanghai Composite – already reflects concerns about China's growth as it has topped off in early March, and begun declining.
Copper – a key commodity in the production process similarly reflects this pressure as it trades in a range throughout February and March unable to push above a recent downward sloping resistance trendline and horizontal resistance at 3.9450.